Diluting Demobilization: The Confluence of Counterinsurgency and Post-Conflict Intervention by Fattal, Alexander L
UC San Diego
UC San Diego Previously Published Works
Title
Diluting Demobilization: The Confluence of Counterinsurgency and Post-Conflict Intervention
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9782705t
Journal
Anthropology News, 50(5)
ISSN
1541-6151
Author
Fattal, Alex
Publication Date
2019-10-06
DOI
10.1111/j.1556-3502.2009.50512.x
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Anthropology News • May 2009
12
i n  f o c u s
Diluting Demobilization
The confluence of counterinsurgency and Post-conflict intervention 
Alex FAttAl 
HArvArd U
We aren’t going to let them fool 
us now. The guerrillas, trying to 
disorient us, produce blood but talk 
of peace. We’re not going to allow 
this, compatriots… We punish 
every violation of human rights, 
but what we cannot allow is that, 
with their little story about peace 
and with their permanent accu-
sations against the armed forces, 
they now paralyze our Democratic 
Security policy, as the FARC’s “intel-
lectual bloc” seeks to do. 
 — Colombian President Álvaro Uribe
With these words at a town hall 
meeting on February 7, 2009, Pres-
ident Álvaro 
Uribe cut to 
the crux of 
the Colom-
bian govern-
ment’s efforts 
to spin the 
nation’s on-
going violent 
conflict to the public. His popu-
list rhetorical strategy is unabash-
edly overt: by accusing the FARC 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) of talking peace while 
waging war, Uribe constructs them 
as evil deceivers. He further implies 
that this calculated deception is 
carried out by a cunning intelli-
gentsia and peddled in the public 
sphere. His reference to an “intel-
lectual bloc” carries a powerful 
subtext that challenges the work of 
national and international human 
rights activists, critical academics 
and students in public universities.
At the same time, the Uribe admin-
istration could itself be accused of 
talking peace while waging war: the 
government is ratcheting up coun-
terinsurgency efforts while experi-
menting with post-conflict inter-
ventions, including demobilization 
and reintegration programs, truth 
telling events, and reparations for 
victims of political violence. Such 
an accusation, however, would 
hinge on an analysis of the post-
conflict interventions that were 
created under the legal framework 
of the Justice and Peace Law of 
2005, which is beyond the scope 
of this essay. Here I want to instead 
focus on one Colombian Ministry 
of Defense program—the Program 
for Humanitarian Attention to the 
Demobilized (PAHD)—as a way of 
analyzing the increasingly incon-
gruous conjugations of humanitari-
anism and militarism in Colombia. 
Guerrilla Marketing: Tricky 
Business
In many ways, the contradictions 
involved in the militarization of 
humanitarian politics are exempli-
fied by the PAHD, which deploys a 
multifaceted marketing campaign 
to promote desertions from rebel 
ranks. The marketing of the PAHD 
program to FARC rebels refa-
shions “guerrilla marketing” tactics 
from the private sector. Ironically 
inspired by guerrilla warfare, guer-
rilla marketing combines aggres-
sive, targeted, furtive and creative 
interventions to win market share 
(Mao in the Boardroom 2003). When 
guerrilla marketing is applied to 
counterinsurgency, it relies upon 
knowledge (or intelligence) about 
insurgent culture, publicity blitzes 
in areas where the FARC is under 
pressure, and former rebels’ social 
networks. The PAHD offers cash 
incentives to demobilized ex-
combatants in exchange for stra-
tegic intelligence, and conducts 
focus groups to gain cultural knowl-
edge about the FARC. Like the 
Human Terrain Systems program 
run by the US Army, the PAHD 
reveals the porous borders between 
military intelligence and anthro-
pological knowledge; however, it 
also interjects another overlapping 
practice: market research. 
The former rebels who navi-
gate this elaborate program face 
conflicting experiences as perpetra-
tors and victims, traitors and collab-
orators, social outcasts and insiders 
who reshape the national body 
politic. These contradictions are 
implicit in the problem of quickly 
turning vilified enemies of the state 
into intimate allies. One instantia-
tion of these tensions is illustrated by 
the conflict between the Defensoria 
del Pueblo (the Colombian govern-
ment’s overseer of human rights) 
and the Ministry of Defense, which 
have an ongoing debate about the 
participation of former rebels in 
military operations. 
At the same time, the FARC has 
marked those who desert its ranks 
as military targets, ensuring that 
even the most humanitarian reha-
bilitative treatment on the part of 
the state cannot separate the two 
expanding spheres of militarism 
and humanitarianism. In her essay, 
“Transitional Subjects,” Theidon 
describes Colombia’s curious 
conjuncture and conflation of post-
conflict technologies and counter-
insurgency strategies as “pre-post 
conflict” (The International Journal 
of Transitional Justice 1). The term 
evokes the jumbled temporality 
of the experience of trauma and 
aptly speaks to a national history in 
which wars’ recursions have unre-
solvably blurred distinctions such 
as conflict and post-conflict. As one 
demobilized rebel put it, “we may 
be demobilized from the war, but 
we live with the sword of Damocles 
over our heads.” 
Demobilization and 
information War
Demobilization as a term emerged 
after World War I, when European 
governments had to reintegrate 
their soldiers into a non-military 
economy (see Cohen’s The War 
Come Home). The term has since 
broadened to refer to state and 
non-state fighters, but the goal of 
reintegration has remained the ulti-
mate objective of demobilization. 
By turning military intelligence 
into a commodity to be purchased 
from the demobilized and thereby 
continuing to keep ex-combat-
ants involved in the conflict they 
sought to escape, the Colombian 
government dilutes the ideals 
behind demobilization and reinte-
gration and muddles the realms 
of counterinsurgency and post-
conflict intervention. 
Consider the case of alias Rojas. 
Motivated by a reward of $320,000, 
Rojas defected with other members 
of his column and the severed 
hand of its slain leader Ivan Rios (a 
member of the FARC secretariat) in 
tow. Defense Minister Juan Manuel 
Santos originally promised Rojas 
his reward. However, the dubious 
legality (let alone ethics) of so amply 
rewarding such brutality has fore-
stalled both the payment and Rojas’ 
incorporation into the govern-
ment’s reintegration program. The 
case has both pleased and perturbed 
the Colombian government. 
As the state appropriates the 
rebels’ guerrilla tactics—dramati-
cally exemplified in the rescue of 
Ingrid Betancourt and her fellow 
captives in July 2008—the need 
for ever more detailed informa-
tion about their adversary is stoked. 
There is no indication that such 
a valuable source of information 
as former rebels will go untapped, 
despite complex ethical concerns 
that have yet to be resolved. These 
former rebels are at the heart of 
Colombia’s information war, 
which hinges on gaining an edge 
in both information technologies 
and their social uses (Berkowitz and 
Goodman 2000). When a former 
rebel sends a text message to his 
ex-commander assuring him the 
state is not torturing him, but is 
rather paying for his health care and 
putting his children through school, 
and that ex-combatant invites the 
commander to demobilize as well, 
communication and collaboration 
between demobilized rebels and 
state security forces is required.
In this case, counterinsur-
gency and post-conflict methods 
do overlap, but without demobi-
lized rebels returning to the regions 
from which they fled or physically 
participating in military operations. 
However, the highly problem-
atic overlap between the military’s 
counterinsurgency efforts and the 
state’s post-conflict reintegration 
practices continues. If the state is to 
accuse FARC rebels of talking peace 
while waging war, it should make 
sure its own acts of peace not only 
give the appearance of humani-
tarian post-conflict interventions, 
but also in practice exemplify the 
humanist ideals behind the vision 
of a post-conflict society. 
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